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Abstract 
The International Competition Network (ICN), which is an unofficial global network of 
competition authorities, promotes the international convergence of competition law and policy. 
The article examines how this emerging network accommodates increasing diversity among its 
members. Drawing on key publications of the ICN and secondary sources, the article reveals 
core elements of the ICN’s ‘benchmarking’ strategy for regulatory convergence among its 
heterogeneous members. Theoretically, the article contributes to the literature on international 
public policies by identifying major factors which facilitate international policy convergence 
even in the absence of a rigorous implementation mechanism based on hard law. 
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Introduction 
Competition policy, which is also known as antitrust policy or antimonopoly policy in some 
countries, is a key element of contemporary global economic governance. Typically through the 
exercise of legal instruments such as economic and/or criminal sanctions, competition 
authorities regulate anticompetitive business conduct such as cartels, the abuse of dominance 
by monopolists, and mega-mergers which would significantly reduce competition in a certain 
market. A remarkable development in this policy field is an explosion in the number of 
competition laws and institutions around the world in the past few decades. Only around 20 
【article】Encouraging policy convergence while enhancing inclusive membership? 
 A challenge for the ICN as a transgovernmental network（Hikaru Yoshizawa） 
 
46 
 
countries had competition laws in 1990, whereas the figure soared to nearly 120 by year 2010 
and still continues to increase (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) 2014: 26-27). It means that competition policy is no longer a luxury of developed 
countries. Many developing countries are now equipped with competition laws. Some emerging 
economies have also recently established or substantially updated their competition regimes, 
often with distinctive characteristics (Calvani and Alderman: 2010). As a consequence, there is 
considerable variation across jurisdictions in this area in terms of policy goals, institutional 
settings, and regulatory instruments for law enforcement. This ever-growing diversity in 
competition regulation poses the problem of interjurisdictional frictions. It is in this context that 
the International Competition Network (ICN) has emerged as an unofficial, global network of 
competition authorities, aiming for the international convergence of competition law and policy. 
Some existing works on the ICN have addressed a normative question of whether the ICN 
should eventually be transformed into a full-fledged legislative body (Hollman and Kovacic 
2011; Clarke 2006), while others investigate the historical origins of the ICN and its mode of 
governance (Lugard 2011; Fox 2009; Budzinski 2004). There is also rich academic literature on 
the question of why influential actors such as the U.S. preferred the ICN to other, more formal 
and long-standing institutions such as the OECD, the United Nations Conference for Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Papadopoulos 2010; 
Damro 2006a, 2006b). That being said, the literature insufficiently analyzes the ICN as an actor 
with its own strategy. Therefore, the article aims to contribute to the literature by analyzing how 
exactly the ICN pursues its primary goal of international policy convergence. 
In terms of the promotion of international policy convergence, the ICN faces a serious 
dilemma: the more successful the ICN is in terms of attracting new members, the larger the 
diversity among its members. As will be demonstrated in the following sections, the ICN seems 
to recognize this challenge and continuously search for remedies. It is therefore important to 
address the following research question for the better understanding of this network: how does 
the ICN accommodate its increasing diversity, in line with its main goal of the promotion of 
voluntary international policy convergence? In this article, ‘diversity’ is discussed in the areas 
of policy goals, scope, instruments, and institutional settings as well as various levels of 
expertise on and experience in competition regulation across jurisdictions. 
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A puzzle here lies in the relative success of the ICN at least in its early years. According to 
the existing literature on policy convergence, the major factors which facilitate policy 
convergence are similarities in terms of culture, economic development, and existing 
institutional settings (Holzinger, Jörgens, & Knill 2008: 25). Interestingly, although the 
ever-growing membership of the ICN across continents has resulted in greater divergence 
among its members in all of these three aspects, there is some empirical evidence of policy 
convergence towards the non-binding best practices published by the network (see Section 1.3 
below). In short, this counterintuitive combination of growing diversity, the soft 
implementation mechanism, and the relative policy achievement vis-à-vis its own goals, makes 
the ICN an intriguing case for the study of international policy convergence. 
This article makes a twofold argument. First, it argues that a close examination of the ICN’s 
experiences can help to identify core elements of effective policy convergence based on the 
mechanism of ‘benchmarking’. Second, the ICN’s non-binding recommendations / best 
practices have already had some impact on national legislation, at least in the area of merger 
control, but this relative achievement vis-à-vis its own goals should not be exaggerated. The 
ICN tackled relatively undemanding areas in its first decade and may well face more difficulty 
when its focus shifts to other areas such as monopoly control. 
Empirically, drawing on key publications of the ICN as well as secondary sources, the article 
provides a first systematic account of its benchmarking strategy in the face of growing diversity 
among its members. Theoretically, the article contributes to the literature on international public 
policies by demonstrating the possibility that policy convergence could work even in the 
absence of a centralized international organization with a rigorous implementation mechanism 
based on hard law. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 1 firstly explains why the international policy 
convergence of competition laws and policies is important. Then, it provides background 
information about a historical context in which the ICN emerged as a major venue for 
multilateral cooperation in this policy field. Section 2 clarifies the distinctiveness of 
benchmarking as a heuristic conceptual tool, and also explains why other mechanisms of policy 
convergence identified in the literature are not directly relevant to the analysis of the ICN. 
Section 3 points out four key elements which underpin the ICN’s strategy for benchmarking, 
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while Section 4 demonstrates why the ICN’s performance against its own goal of policy 
convergence can be regarded as a ‘success’ only with reservations. The final part summarizes 
empirical findings and draws conclusions. 
 
 
1 ICN: A unique venue for multilateral cooperation on competition 
The ICN is an unofficial, transgovernmental network of competition policy officials established 
in 2001, which also incorporates practitioners, stakeholders and academics into its governance 
as nongovernmental advisors. It aims to enhance international convergence through the 
facilitation of bottom-up benchmarking exercises across countries and the publication of 
non-binding best practices and recommendations concerning competition regulation (ICN 
2001). Its original membership was merely 16 competition authorities from 14 jurisdictions, but 
it jumped to 114 authorities from 100 jurisdictions by year 2010 (Motta 2011: 219). This rapid 
expansion made the ICN a key institutional component of emerging global competition 
governance. Today, around 130 authorities from 120 jurisdictions constitute this network. 
Before examining the ICN’s relevance to the issue of international benchmarking, which is a 
particular mechanism of policy convergence, it is important to understand why international 
convergence matters in competition policy in the first place. There are already several 
international institutions which deal with competition issues to some extent, so it is by no 
means obvious why the ICN is preferred by many countries as a venue for multilateral 
cooperation. Thus, the historical context of the emergence of the ICN should also be explained, 
especially in relation to the deadlock of WTO negotiations on this matter. And this historical 
analysis leads to the question of the distinctiveness of the ICN as a promoter of international 
policy convergence. 
 
1.1 Convergence as a response to economic interdependence 
Competition policies differ significantly across countries and regions in terms of policy 
objectives, case analysis methods, and procedures (Gerber 2010: 262-267). In terms of policy 
objectives, they vary from economic goals (e.g. efficient production and distribution) to social 
ones (e.g. consumer protection, the protection of small- and medium-sized enterprises) to 
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political ones (e.g. the facilitation of regional economic integration) (Dabbah 2003: 52-54). 
Likewise, case analysis methods differ across countries, mainly because of competition 
authorities’ diverse policy goals noted above. For example, some competition regulators put 
emphasis on the ‘abuse’ of dominant positions in the analysis of monopoly control, while others 
regard ‘market dominance’ itself as a problem. In some countries, mergers are generally 
regarded as a good thing in the sense that they tend to help the emergence of large, 
internationally competitive companies (‘national champions’), while other countries stress the 
potential anticompetitive effect of mergers between large market players. To make the situation 
even more complicated, there is no single international agreement on competition regulation 
which defines the procedures of, for example, the exchange of confidential business 
information between competition agencies. Given the reality of such diversity in terms of 
policy goals, substantive tests, and procedures, it should not come as a big surprise that neither 
the method of harmonization through international law, nor the method of mutual recognition, 
have gained wide support. This is why the idea of ‘international convergence’ has come to the 
fore as an alternative in response to growing economic interdependence on a global scale. 
While such diversity in competition policies is not inherently a negative phenomenon 
(Budzinski 2008), it becomes problematic when economic globalization goes without 
comprehensive global competition law. On the one hand, most jurisdictional boundaries are 
nationally defined in this area, with only a few exceptions such as the European Union (EU). 
On the other hand, business activities are becoming more and more international. And it is this 
mismatch that creates demand for international cooperation in this field. More specifically, a 
high level of divergence across jurisdictions in competition policy may run three risks, namely 
those of (1) interjurisdictional frictions, (2) impediments to international cooperation in law 
enforcement, and (3) legal uncertainty. 
Regarding the risk of interjurisdictional conflicts, the central issue is the idea of 
extraterritoriality, which was originally developed in the U.S. For example, the EU-U.S. 
controversy over the GE/Honeywell merger case in 2001 underlined the salience of the problem 
of extraterritoriality (Gerber 2010: 95-100: Dabbah 2003). In this case, the Antitrust Division of 
the U.S. Department of Justice approved a merger plan between two giant American 
manufacturers, GE and Honeywell, with only minor conditions. However, the European 
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Commission prohibited the deal, highlighting the potential anticompetitive effects of the 
proposed merger1. This disagreement resulted in the politicization of competition regulation, 
although the two parties had bilateral agreements on enforcement cooperation and exchanged 
information about the case extensively (Morgan and McGuire 2004). 
A closely related issue is that procedural differences make international enforcement 
cooperation more difficult, even among like-minded competition authorities. Cartel control is a 
good example here. Nowadays, international cartels such as price-fixing and market-sharing are 
surprisingly sophisticated. Numerous multinational companies communicate secretly on a 
regular basis for cartel arrangements and even run their own monitoring system in order to 
detect rule-breaking cartel members effectively. This is why competition authorities have an 
incentive to approximate their rules in order to reinforce international enforcement cooperation 
(e.g. the simultaneous investigation of cartel members by multiple competition agencies). 
As for legal uncertainty, national discrepancy creates room for manipulation by enterprises. 
For example, multinational corporations may notify their cross-border merger plan first to a 
competition authority which is most likely to approve the request, and then proceed to other 
authorities concerned. In such a situation, the decision of the first authority may affect 
subsequent decisions by the others, and the outcome of such forum-shopping by firms is highly 
unpredictable. This would result in greater legal uncertainty, which affects both regulators and 
firms. 
These risks arise from intense economic interdependence and diverse national and regional 
competition regimes. This is why there is a wide recognition of the importance of international 
policy convergence, which would alleviate these problems. Then, the next question is, which 
international institution is suitable for such international convergence efforts? This is the topic 
now the article turns to. 
 
1.2 Global multilateral cooperation – but which venue? 
To understand the distinctiveness and historical context of the ICN, it is important to consider 
first why multilateralism is important in competition policy. One may argue that multilateral 
                                                   
1 Case COMP/M.2220, General Electric/Honeywell. See European Commission’s decision of 3 July 2001, 
OJ L48/1, 18 February 2004. 
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cooperation is essential for effective public regulation in this area for two key reasons. First, 
multilateralism has a potential for the empowerment of individual states which do not have 
sufficient problem-solving capacity to tackle transnational anticompetitive business practices 
alone. Second, although bilateralism remains important in this field, it has a clear limitation 
simply because cross-border business activities seldom take place in only two jurisdictions. 
They often involve dozens of jurisdictions. 
That being said, it is too naive to believe that multinational cooperation always works. A 
prime example of failed multilateral cooperation in the area of competition is the WTO. At the 
WTO ministerial conference in Singapore in 1996, competition policy was nominated as a 
potential item of the WTO’s round negotiation agenda, together with the other Singapore 
issues2. Subsequently, the WTO established a Working Group on the Interaction between Trade 
and Competition Policy. Despite the enthusiasm of the main promoter of international 
competition regulation, that is the EU, the idea of competition rule-making met a strong 
opposition from the majority of developing countries and emerging powers such as India 
(Papadopoulos 2010: 233-234). Moreover, the U.S. was critical of the EU’s proposal because 
the former preferred a more informal, competition-dedicated network, which would not 
significantly constrain the sovereignty of its member states (Damro 2006a; 2006b). As a 
consequence, the issue was dropped from the Doha Round agenda at the Cancun ministerial 
conference, which was held in 2003. 
Given its focus on international rule-making and judicialization, the WTO is not well 
equipped to deal with the growing membership and associated divergent ideas and interests. 
This is particularly the case in areas such as competition, in which developing and developed 
countries have very different opinions. Similarly, while the OECD and UNCTAD have issued 
some influential non-binding recommendations and a set of principles concerning competition 
policy, their organizational structures do not allow them to tackle the issue of diversity 
effectively. Above all, the OECD is dominated by developed countries, while UNCTAD has 
assigned importance to developing countries since its inception. It should also be noted that the 
competition issue has never been a top priority in the WTO, the OECD and UNCTAD. It is 
occasionally discussed only in the broader context of international trade and/or development. 
                                                   
2 The other Singapore issues are investment, public procurement, and trade facilitation. 
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1.3: The ICN: its key characteristics and impacts 
In contrast to the case of these international organizations, multilateralism seems to have 
worked in the context of the ICN. Thus, it is essential to understand key features of this network, 
and its impact on the member states in order to illustrate the significance of this institution. The 
ICN is a program-oriented network, which was established in October 2001 by 16 competition 
authorities from 14 jurisdictions: Australia, Canada, the EU, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the U.S., and 
Zambia. The network possesses neither a permanent address nor a dedicated secretariat. It 
financially relies on contributions from member authorities and lacks a legal personality. In 
addition to such informality, voluntarism characterizes this network. In order to encourage 
voluntary convergence to substantial and procedural regulatory standards, the ICN facilitates 
information and experience sharing among its member authorities, while issuing various 
non-binding recommendations on a consensus basis (ICN 2001: 1; 2012: 5). The idea of this 
unofficial, voluntary structure largely derives from the influential report of the International 
Competition Policy Advisory Committee (2000), which was appointed by the U.S. Department 
of Justice in 1997. The ICN also aims to support competition advocacy and to facilitate 
intergovernmental cooperation, while these objectives are regarded as secondary and 
complementary to the primary goal of convergence (ICN 2001: 1; 2012: 5). As noted above, a 
major difference from the WTO, the OECD and UNCTAD is that the ICN dedicates itself to the 
issue of competition policy. 
Despite its short history, the ICN has already had an impact on its member countries’ 
competition rules. So, it should not be simply dismissed as a mere talking shop. Since the ICN’s 
publication is most extensive in the field of merger control, it is worth assessing the impact of 
the ICN in this area to understand the relevance of this network. During the period from 2002 to 
2006, 13 recommended practices in merger control have been agreed by the ICN members on a 
unanimous basis. They cover major areas such as notification thresholds, the timing of 
notification, and substantial analytical methods. The Merger Working Group periodically 
conducts surveys for the assessment of national implementation and for the better quality of 
work products. According to this working group’s report published in 2010 (ICN 2010: 30), 35 
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agencies (65% of 54 respondents) answered that they had already changed their merger rules 
based on the work products of this group. In addition, Coppola (2011: 225; see also Coppola 
and Lagdameo 2011) provides quantitative data concerning regulatory convergence in merger 
control. For example, among 87 ICN members with merger control regimes, 44 jurisdictions 
were in conformity with recommended practices concerning review periods in 2011. 27 out of 
these 44 jurisdictions conducted reforms which brought them into compliance with the 
recommended practices. With regard to the recommended practices concerning thresholds, 39 
members had rules which were in line with these recommendations. 18 out of these 39 
jurisdictions experienced legislative or administrative reforms for this, while the rest (i.e. 21) 
had ICN-compatible rules from the beginning. 
While these quantitative data show a correlation between ICN membership and changes in 
members’ competition rules, there is also some evidence of causality. For example, the ICN’s 
document, which is entitled ‘State of Achievements 2001-2012’ (ICN 2012: 13; see also 2005: 
5-6), provides concrete examples of the impacts of the ICN’s merger-related products. These 
examples are important in the sense that their changes are clearly attributable to ICN 
publications because the national authorities concerned voluntarily assert the influence. 
Reportedly, the Czech, Swedish and Finnish agencies used the ICN’s recommended practices 
when conducting reforms to their merger thresholds, while Colombia and Costa Rica utilized 
the ICN’s recommended practices regarding review periods to reform their procedural rules. 
Likewise, Eduardo Pérez Motta, a former president of the Federal Competition Commission 
of Mexico, provides concrete examples of an impact that the ICN had on his country. According 
to him, Mexico made major amendments to the 1993 Federal Law of Economic Competition in 
2006, and it was the ICN’s recommendations that inspired these amendments, including higher 
sanctions for monopolistic practices, the Competition Commission’s power to conduct on-site 
searches, and the launch of a cartel leniency program3 (Motta 2011: 221). Even in such a 
country like Belgium, which has been heavily influenced by EU law and OECD 
recommendations, the ICN’s recommended practices gave an inspiration to the Belgian 
Competition Act of 3 April 2013 concerning the strict time constraints on merger control4. 
                                                   
3 He specifically refers to Chapter 2 of ICN Anti-cartel Enforcement Manual, entitled ‘Drafting and 
Implementing an Effective Leniency Program’, as the recommendation which had an impact. 
4 Interview to an official of the Belgian Competition Authority, 27 November 2013. 
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In short, the ICN’s recommendations have inspired numerous changes to national 
competition rules, primarily in the area of merger. It is therefore worth considering the ICN’s 
strategy for international policy convergence in further details from a theoretical perspective. 
 
 
2 Benchmarking as a heuristic conceptual tool for the analysis of policy convergence 
At times, policy convergence as a ‘concept’ is used as a synonym to policy transfer and policy 
diffusion, albeit their different focuses. To avoid conceptual ambiguity, one may assert that the 
analytical focus of policy convergence is the effect of independent variables on policy outputs 
and outcomes (an increase or decrease in similarity over time), whereas policy transfer and 
diffusion are mainly concerned with processes (adoption patterns) (Knill 2005: 765). For 
example, a phenomenon like ‘diffusion without convergence’ is possible according to this 
distinction because diffused ideas might be adapted in various ways depending on local 
political contexts (Radaelli 2005: 927). 
While this distinction is useful for conceptual clarification, what is more significant in this 
article is policy convergence as a ‘theoretical framework’ accommodating various accounts for 
the causes of convergence. The literature identifies five key mechanisms of cross-national 
policy convergence (Holzinger, Jörgens and Knill 2008: 22): (1) independent problem solving; 
(2) imposition; (3) harmonization based on binding international law; (4) regulatory 
competition among jurisdictions; and (5) transnational communication. The following parts first 
argue that transnational communication is the most relevant mechanism for the analysis of the 
ICN, and in addition elaborate on its subcategory, benchmarking. 
 
2.1 Which mechanism of policy convergence? 
The first four mechanisms of policy convergence are not directly relevant to ICN governance. 
The mechanism of independent problem solving refers to the process of convergence, which 
occurs as a consequence of mutually independent governmental efforts responding to similar, 
pervasive problems. This first mechanism is the least relevant to collective efforts for 
convergence, and therefore has little to do with the ICN’s function. It is also very far from the 
mechanism of imposition because the ICN’s decentralized, voluntary nature does not allow for 
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such a mechanism based on hierarchical relations. The third category, international 
harmonization, refers to the convergence of national and regional laws towards international 
laws. This is exactly what the WTO’s Working Group on the Interaction between Competition 
and Trade Policy aimed for since 1996 based on the EU initiative, as explained above. Yet, the 
ICN denies any ambition of making binding rules (ICN 2011), so the logic of international 
harmonization does not apply to the ICN. The fourth pattern, regulatory competition, means the 
market-driven process of policy convergence. Some researchers hypothesize that national 
competition policies tend to converge to the lowest common denominator due to transnational 
market forces seeking for minimum regulation, while others provide some empirical evidence 
of convergence to the highest common denominator (Vogel: 1997). The analytical focus of the 
debate over regulatory competition is the direction of convergence. Yet, since the very 
beginning, the ICN takes the benchmarking approach dealing with the facilitation of the race to 
the highest standard. So, the most relevant theoretical issues relating to the ICN are the degree 
rather than the direction of convergence. Moreover, the logic of regulatory competition is not 
prevalent in competition policy because, in contrast to some other areas such as company law, 
numerous national and regional competition laws may simultaneously apply to individual 
companies (Fox 2006: 355). 
By contrast, the fifth category, transnational communication, is directly relevant to the ICN. 
The former concerns policy convergence through communication rather than imposition, 
bargaining and competition (Holzinger, Jörgens and Knill 2008). It is particularly useful for the 
analysis of informal, decentralized networks such as the ICN whose primary function is the 
facilitation of exchange of ideas and experience among participants. Yet, transnational 
communication is an umbrella concept and takes various forms. Therefore, it is important to 
situate the mechanism of benchmarking in this literature and to clarify its features. 
 
2.2 Benchmarking as a distinctive form of transnational communication 
The ICN encourages information exchange and experience sharing among policy makers and 
transnational actors. So, its activities involve the process of lesson drawing, which is one form 
of transnational communication (Holzinger, Jörgens and Knill 2008). Yet, the real driving force 
of policy convergence facilitated by the ICN is a ‘legitimacy pressure’ rather than mere copying 
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or emulation (Budzinski 2004), and this is the key feature of benchmarking (Holzinger and 
Knill 2008: 47-48). Benchmarking is a method of governance, which promotes superior policy 
models. It occurs when governments copy a certain model of public regulation promoted by 
other actors (e.g. international organizations) as best practices / benchmarks based on 
cross-national comparisons and peer-reviews. Benchmarks may serve not only as a constraint, 
but also as an opportunity for regulators. In fact, international recognition would help them to 
promote these rules in their own jurisdictions vis-à-vis other governmental bodies and the 
general public. This is the main reason why numerous regulatory agencies join 
benchmark-building international networks. 
According to Lundvall and Tomlinson (2002: 209-210), successful benchmarking needs to 
avoid simplistic goals and take contexts into account because best practices in one area could 
be totally irrelevant or even have negative impacts in another. This is an important point, as will 
be revisited below, but it still does not answer the question of how to manage diversity while 
enhancing convergence. In this light, the following case study of the ICN not only demonstrates 
the importance of a bottom-up approach, but also reveals the actual strategy of the ICN for the 
accommodation of growing diversity without hard law. 
?
?
3 Benchmarking as a strategy of the ICN: limited scope, extensive interactions 
Given the evidence of the impact of the ICN’s recommendations on its members’ competition 
laws, one may wonder why international policy convergence can be facilitated by unofficial 
decentralized institutions such as the ICN. More specifically, what does the ICN’s method of 
benchmarking look like, and how does it accommodate the growing diversity among the 
members? 
 
3.1 A bottom-up approach to experience sharing 
One crucial component of the ICN’s strategy for benchmarking is its bottom-up approach. For 
example, the ICN’s initial focus on merger control was a bottom-up initiative based on specific 
demand from the EU and the U.S. (Janow and Rill 2011: 26-27). Another example is the ICN’s 
continuous engagement in advocacy and capacity-building efforts, which reflect the particular 
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need of the members, especially developing countries. 
This bottom-up approach is also evident in the fact that these convergence efforts focus on 
specific technical issues and procedures rather than general norms. After the establishment of 
the ICN, a leading American lawyer E. Fox (2006: 290-291) observed that ‘the dominant 
international antitrust conversation has shifted from concepts of cosmopolitan world principles 
to practical details (e.g. timing of merger filings), cross-fertilization and slow evolution of 
common norms’ over time. This does not necessarily mean that the ICN’s work products are 
value-free. On the contrary, they tend to stress the positive aspects of market competition, while 
referring to general norms such as transparency and fairness (ICN 2002). Nevertheless, they 
mostly do so in specific contexts, particularly in discussion over regulatory procedures. 
 
3.2 Maximization of interactions 
This bottom-up approach is impossible without extensive interactions among the ICN members 
on a regular basis. And it is clear that most day-to-day activities of the ICN are about 
information and experience sharing. The members of this network frequently contact each other 
via emails and phone calls, and hold online video seminars on various topics concerning 
competition law enforcement. One source reports that approximately 90 percent of interactions 
among the members are conducted by email and telephone conferencing (Damro 2006b: 146). 
Because of the project-oriented nature of the ICN, it is not always easy to recognize and follow 
all its publications even for insiders. Therefore, a product catalogue is downloadable on the 
ICN website. Templates are also important for information pooling. First, working group 
coordinators distribute templates for country profiles to the member agencies. And then, the 
latter fill in requested information about the statutory and administrative rules of their countries. 
Finally, these documents are uploaded to the website so that all members can get access. In 
these ways, the ICN encourages interactions among its members not only for networking but 
also for knowledge accumulation. 
 
 
3.3 Keeping delegates’ profiles homogeneous 
While both extensive interactions and experience sharing through a bottom-up approach are of 
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great importance, they are insufficient to guarantee effective benchmarking. They work 
effectively when coupled with two other elements. One of them concerns membership, and the 
literature on transgovernmental networks is directly relevant here. The literature on 
transgovernmental networks shows that there is a growing number of unofficial global 
networks of government officials. These networks usually focus on particular policy areas. 
These officials may include not only senior ‘diplomats’ of the ministry of foreign affairs, but 
also judges, legislators, and officials of various government departments and agencies. For 
example, one case study of the seminar work of Slaughter (2004: 65-103) on this subject is a 
rapidly growing network of constitutional judges across countries. Similarly, Raustiala (2002: 
26-50) underlines the emergence of issue-specific networks of regulators in the areas of 
securities regulation, competition policy, and environmental policy. Their empirical findings 
indicate that these unofficial, non-hierarchical networks benefit from the homogeneity of their 
members, and this is exactly the case in the ICN. 
As noted above, ICN membership has nothing to do with the level of economic development. 
What is required is that its members must be competition authorities. This condition increases 
the homogeneity of the delegates’ profiles because they need to be competition officials, and 
not officials working in other related fields such as trade policy, development policy, and 
industrial policy. In other words, the rapid expansion of the ICN’s membership may result in 
divergent interests and ideas, but the members still share the same perspective, that is 
competition. 
 
3.4 Restrictive agenda 
In addition, in order to accommodate diverse members, the ICN selects its agenda restrictively. 
Regarding the scope of the agenda, there are currently five working groups at the ICN: 
advocacy, agency effectiveness, cartels, mergers, and unilateral conduct (monopoly control). 
Yet, the discussion of the ICN has not gone much beyond these traditional areas of regulation. 
For example, there is no working group on private enforcement or criminal sanctions in 
competition policy. There are no substantial debates on state aid control either. There are also 
issues which are not even discussed in the ICN. One example of this is the issue of export 
cartels, which proved highly controversial in the WTO’s Working Group on the Interaction 
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between Trade and Competition Policy. 
Likewise, the issue of regulation of public sectors is seldom discussed in the ICN. Rather, it 
focuses on the regulation of private sectors’ anticompetitive conduct. The issue of expansion of 
competition policy to publicly regulated sectors (e.g. the telecommunications sector) is put on 
the table. Yet, the recommendations of the ICN in this area remain quite general and vague 
concerning the control of state-owned enterprises. On the one hand, this can be regarded as a 
major limitation of the ICN because there are numerous countries in which the state plays a 
significant role in the economy. On the other hand, if the agenda of regulation of state-owned 
enterprises were included in the agenda, it would have been much more difficult for the ICN to 
attract those countries in which public actors play a major role in their economies. Another 
explanation of the narrow scope of the ICN’s agenda is that the inclusion of competition-related 
issues such as public procurement could trigger a spill-over of ICN works to other areas. That is 
a consequence that would be regarded by the ICN’s members as an impediment to its 
‘competition all of the time’ principle (Janow and Rill 2011: 37). 
?
?
4 Major challenges to further convergence 
The case of the ICN is insightful because it shows the key elements of a successful 
benchmarking. However, it is a ‘success’ with two important reservations. It is important to 
highlight them in order to make a balanced assessment of the ICN’s performance. 
 
4.1 The center of gravity remains in domestic politics 
First, the ICN cannot directly tackle the issue of implementation because of its non-hierarchical 
and voluntary nature. Rigorous competition policy is often in conflict with more interventionist 
public policies such as research and development policy, regional policy, and employment 
policy. Thus, even if like-minded members of the ICN agree on certain recommended practices, 
this does not automatically guarantee the domestic adoption of these international standards. 
The real people competition authorities need to persuade are not their counterparts in other 
jurisdictions, but government departments and agencies of their own countries with a more 
interventionist orientation. In short, since there is so far no comprehensive global competition 
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law which effectively binds states, the center of gravity remains to be in domestic politics. 
That being said, the ICN indirectly deals with the issue of implementation through the 
promotion of advocacy and capacity building. The significance of these issues in the ICN is 
evident in the fact that they constituted one of the two pillars of the first and second ICN 
Annual Conferences together with merger control. It means that these issues were incorporated 
into the agenda earlier than more established areas of competition regulation such as cartels and 
monopoly. For competition policies, advocacy which targets other government departments and 
agencies is significant because it has a potential for enhancing the autonomy of competition 
authorities from more powerful departments in related fields. It would also foster a domestic 
basis for cross-jurisdictional policy convergence towards international regulatory practices. 
Some ICN members have already referred to the ICN’s recommended practices in order to 
convince legislative bodies of their reform proposals’ credibility (ICN 2012: 14)5. This fact 
confirms the claim made in the theoretical part that internationally recognized best practices 
could empower competition authorities in domestic politics. Likewise, capacity building 
potentially leads to more effective enforcement, and to the greater visibility and presence of 
competition authorities within their own governments. This is not a place to assess the impact 
of advocacy and capacity-building activities of the ICN in details. Yet, one may at least say that 
the ICN’s constant focus on this aspect of competition policy is an indication of its members’ 
continuous political struggle with the domestic adoption of international regulatory standards, 
including those promoted by the ICN. 
 
4.2 A reality behind the rhetoric of ‘informed divergence’ 
Another point which deserves a critical evaluation is the rhetoric of ‘informed divergence’ used 
by ICN officials. According to the ICN’s report of 2011 entitled ‘Vision for its Second Decade’ 
(ICN 2011: 5-6), in areas where differences between the members’ rules are relatively narrow 
(e.g. leniency programs and the time frame of merger review), the ICN aims for the publication 
                                                   
5 For example, according to the ICN’s document of 2012 ‘ICN Statement of Achievements 2001-2012’, 
German and Irish competition authorities have cited the ICN’s recommended practices on mergers in their 
official documents in order to demonstrate that the reforms they are proposing are in full conformity with 
international standards. 
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of recommended practices and guidelines in cooperation with national competition agencies. 
By contrast, in areas where the differences are greater (e.g. the area of regulation of unilateral 
conduct), ‘the ICN facilitates “informed divergence”: identifying the nature and sources of 
apparent divergence and understanding and respecting any underlying divergent rationale’ (ICN 
2011: 6) (emphasis in the original). 
The ICN does not openly admit its limitations, but the rhetoric of informed divergence 
essentially means a policy failure. The above-mentioned 2011 report, among others, indicates 
that the ICN’s Steering Committee foresees difficulties in further policy convergence, 
especially in areas such as monopoly control. In contrast to merger control, the impact of the 
ICN in other areas is ambiguous so far. First of all, except for the area of merger control, there 
is little comprehensive data concerning the domestic implementation of the ICN’s 
recommended practices. Secondly, the majority of the working groups are still at the 
experience-sharing stage rather than the model-promotion stage. One interesting area which is 
in transition between these two stages is the Unilateral Conduct Working Group, which focuses 
on the regulation of monopolists. For example, this working group has adopted two sets of 
recommendations, namely Recommended Practices on the Assessment of Dominance and 
Substantial Market Power, and Recommended Practices on the Application of Unilateral 
Conduct Rules to State-owned Monopolies. Although this is a noticeable development, there is 
no comprehensive dataset concerning the member’s alignment with these recommendations. It 
is safe to say that future consensus building on specific monopolistic business conduct is not an 
easy task because the ICN’s members have divergent viewpoints regarding monopoly control. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Debates on the convergence of competition policies often lead to a very broad question of 
whether competition policy is inherently a good thing or a bad thing. Rather than rehearsing 
these debates, this article has problematized the fact that different countries understand 
competition policy in different ways. The number of competition authorities around the world 
has increased exponentially in the last few decades. Subsequently, multilateral cooperation and 
coordination have become essential. This is the main reason for the establishment of the ICN as 
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a global platform for policy convergence. Its rapid expansion is remarkable. However, the 
increase in the number and diversity among its members is at the same time a fundamental 
challenge to this young network of competition regulators. This article has revealed key 
components of the ICN’s strategy for benchmarking in the face of this challenge. While existing 
works tend to treat the ICN as a factor in the deadlock of WTO negotiations on competition law, 
this research has analyzed the former as an incipient actor with its own strategy for 
benchmarking. Specifically, the research has identified four distinct and interconnected 
elements of the strategy taken by the ICN’s Steering Committee: (1) the bottom-up approach; 
(2) the provision of ample opportunities for interactions among its members; (3) the 
maintenance of the homogeneous profiles of delegates; and, last but not least, (4) the restrictive 
selection of agenda. 
Overall, one may conclude that the ICN’s performance is remarkable vis-à-vis its own goals 
in the short run. Nevertheless, it would face more difficulties in the long run due to remaining, 
more controversial issues such as rules for monopoly policy for specific business conduct. As 
Coppola and Lagdameo (2011: 315) succinctly put it, it seems that the ICN ‘has already picked 
up low hanging fruit’. Initially, the ICN dealt with relatively undemanding areas seemingly 
because the concrete evidence of success would enhance its credibility as a promoter of 
benchmarking exercises. When one evaluates the ICN’s performance, this organizational 
strategy should be taken into account. 
These empirical findings have theoretical relevance beyond the area of competition because 
the governance mode of bottom-up benchmarking based on non-binding recommendations is 
becoming increasingly prevalent in transgovernmental networks across a wide range of areas 
(Hale and Held 2011). Therefore, a comparison with transgovernmental networks in other 
policy fields may be useful to ascertain the key findings of this single case study. In that case, 
issue-specific factors such as potential competition between these networks and existing 
international organizations should be taken into account. 
One of the reasons why the WTO dropped the competition issue from the Doha development 
agenda before starting official negotiations is the growing assertiveness of emerging powers 
such as India, aside from the EU-U.S. disagreement. In this sense, a shift in power balance is 
important in competition policy, just as it is in many other areas. However, neither the logic of 
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imposition nor that of harmonization have much space in highly decentralized institutions such 
as the ICN. As demonstrated throughout this research, the ICN’s main activities are 
characterized by trangovernmental networking and communication, which would facilitate 
bottom-up benchmarking practices. 
?
?
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